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INTRODUCTION
This paper argues in favor of the reform of the Jordanian Constitutional 
Court (hereinafter JCC) in order to make it more democratic, effective, 
and accessible. The JCC is one of the most recent constitutional courts 
in the Arab region1 and was established in 2012.2 It was introduced to 
enhance the role of the law and legal transparency.3 However, the new 
JCC faces many challenges that call for its reform. Legal reform has 
always been a continuous process in every nation, and across history.4 
This paper is a comparative methodology to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the proposed reform.
1. Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1 January 1952, 
amend in 2011, art. 59/1. See also, Law No. 15 of 2012 (Constitutional Court 
Law), 6 June 2013, art. 15/A (Jordan).
2. Issam Saliba, Jordan: Constitutional Law Court Newly Established in Jordan, 
Global Legal Monitor, Library of Congress, (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.
loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/jordan-constitutional-law-court-newly-es-
tablished-in-jordan/.
3. Alnswr: Alt’adilat al-dusturiat Iidafat muhima fi ‘amaliat al’iislah alsiyasii wa-
taeziz aldiymuqratia, Petra (Jul. 7, 2017), http://petra.gov.jo/Public_News/
Nws_NewsDetails.aspx?Site_Id=2&lang=1&NewsID=164113&CatID=13.
4. Anne Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1787, 1828 (1994-
1995), See also, Scott Grinsell, Caste and Problem of Social Reform in Indian 
Equality Law, 35 Yale J. Int’l L. 199, 218 (2010).
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The JCC reform explores three dimensions: philosophical 
(democratic), substantive (effective), and procedural (accessible) 
amendments. Firstly, the JCC lacks a clear legal philosophy. The 
unconventional role of the JCC in a monarchical regime requires the 
adoption of unprecedented philosophy. Secondly, substantive reform 
enhances the effectiveness of the JCC. Expanding the JCC jurisdictions 
safeguards the individuals’ rights. Thirdly, procedural amendment 
enhances the accessibility of the JCC. It ensures sole and ultimate 
jurisdiction of the JCC over a constitutional dispute.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL AMENDMENT: 
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
The King of Jordan is taking concrete steps towards becoming a con-
stitutional monarch.5 Establishing the JCC is one such step.6 However, 
giving the JCC the right to strike down any unconstitutional law or 
regulation, similarly to the recent Constitutional Court of the Kingdom 
of Morocco,7 imposes two challenges. These challenges are the JCC’s 
legitimacy and checks and balances. 8 
The first challenge relates to the JCC’s legitimacy in a monarchical 
regime. In most democratic monarchical systems, courts are able to 
declare certain laws as unconstitutional. However, courts are not 
authorized to strike down these laws. In the United Kingdom, courts 
can issue a non-binding declaration of unconstitutionality.9 This means 
5. Layth Kamal Nsrawin, Athar al-ta’edilat al-dusturia li-‘am 2011 ‘ealaa al-sulu-
tat al-‘amat fi al’urdun, http://www.parliament.gov.sy/SD08/msf/1435494620_.
pdf.
6. Constitutional Overview, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Constitution-
al Court, (2017), http://www.cco.gov.jo/en-us/About-the-Court/Constitu-
tional-Overview.
7. Constitution of Kingdom of Morocco, supra note 1, art. 130. 
8. Id. 
9. David Jenkins, Common Law Declarations of Unconstitutionality, 7 Int’J 
Const. L. 183, 200 (2009).
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that the law is unconstitutional, yet still valid.10 In the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands, the 2008 Constitution forbids courts from reviewing 
laws and treaties.11 In the Kingdom of Egypt (1923-1953), courts were 
not permitted to tackle the constitutionality of any law until 1926. 
In its attempt in doing so, the court declared that it would not apply 
unconstitutional law. Yet, it was unable to strike it down.12 Hence, 
the competencies of the JCC are unconventional and sensitive in 
monarchical regimes.
The JCC’s right to render any unconstitutional law invalid represents 
the philosophical idea of a constitutional court in a republican 
sitting, as seen in the US,13 Brazil,14 Tunisia,15 and Egypt,16 but not in 
monarchies. Moreover, the republican system of a constitutional court 
offers profound and rich venues, such as the case of the JCC reform, 
as depicted in later sections. Hence, tackling philosophical challenges, 
especially those of checks and balances, is achieved by adopting 
republican regime solutions.
The second challenge lies in the lack of checks and balances between 
the King, the JCC, and the Parliament. The JCC’s appointment process 
rests solely with the King,17 which can compromise the entire democratic 
process in Jordan.18 Before the 2011 Constitutional Amendments, 
10. Id.
11. Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 20 October 2008, 
art. 120.
12. ‘an al-Mahkamah, lamha tarikhayah, Supreme Constitutional Court, Egypt, 
(2014).
13. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 138 (1803).
14. Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, October 5, 1988, 
with the alterations introduced by Constitutional Amendments No. 1/1992 
through 64/2010 and by Revision Constitutional Amendments No. 1/1994 
through 6/1994, art. 102. 
15. Constitution of the Tunisia Republic, 26 Jan. 2014 art. 118. 
16. Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 18 Jan. 2014.
17. Constitutional Court Law, art. 5/A. 
18. See generally, Tom Ginsburg & Nuno Garoupa, Building Reputation in Consti-
tutional Courts, Political and Judicial Audiences, 28 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 
539, 547 (2011).
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article 93 gave members of Parliament, who are elected by the public,19 
the right to challenge the King’s decision in the event of his refusal 
to ratification any new law.20 In 2011, constitutional amendments 
gave the JCC’s judges the right to nullify any unconstitutional law, 21 
while it did not give any authority to the Parliament over the JCC.22 
This amendment, theoretically, gives a privilege to the King over the 
Parliament. If the King opposes any law, he may use the JCC to strike 
down the law, as he is the sole source of JCC legitimacy.23 Therefore, 
hypothetically the JCC can be used against the public will. 
The solution to checks and balances lies in adopting a democratic 
appointment process, being the core of democratic court system. In 
the US, the President has the right to choose federal judges, while the 
Congress has the right to confirm the choice.24 Moreover, the Congress 
has the sole right to impeach judges,25 who hold offices “during good 
behavior.”26 The split in the authority of appointment and impeachment, 
between the president and the Congress, ensures a democratic 
government. In Germany, both Houses of Parliament elect the Federal 
Constitutional Court judges.27 This increases confidence in the judges 
when they decide to strike-down parliamentary laws.28 Hence, adopting 
a republican solution helps to overcome any philosophical challenges.
19. Constitution of Kingdom of Morocco, supra note 1, art. 93.
20. Id. art. 67/1.
21. Id. at art. 15/B. 
22. Id. art. 5/A.
23. Id. art. 15/A.
24. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
25. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
26. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
27. Federal Constitutional Court Act in the version of 11 August 1993 (Federal 
Law Gazette I p. 1473) last amended by Article 8 of the Regulation of 31 August 
2015 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 1474)”, Part 1, §5. 
28. Mary Volcansek, Judicial Elections and American Exceptionalism: A Compar-
ative Perspective, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 805, 809 (2010-2011), See also,  Stephen 
Gardbaum, Are Strong Constitutional Courts Always a Good Thing for New De-
mocracies, 53 Colum. J. Transnat’L. 285, 307 (2014-2015). 
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II. SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT: 
EFFECTIVE COMPETENCIES
The JCC needs to increase its competencies for effective constitutional 
protection.29 The JCC law limits the court competencies to only two 
issues, which are constitutional supervision over laws,30 and interpre-
tation of the constitution.31 This paper, however, recommends adding 
two new competencies, namely the preventive control of constitution-
ality and conflict of jurisdictions. 
Firstly, the JCC law shall include both preventive control of 
constitutionality and successive control of constitutionality. Currently, 
the law limits the JCC’s role to successive control of constitutionality only.32 
This form of constitutional supervision starts after the promulgation of 
the law.33 However, introducing preventive control of constitutionality 
will extend the constitutional protection to earlier stages.34 This saves 
the legal system from dire consequences of unconstitutionality.35 The 
French Conseil Constitutionnel has the ultimate authority to decide 
the constitutionality of any law before its promulgation.36 This process, 
on the one hand, gives laws a constitutional legitimacy.37 On the other 
29. Mohamed Malham, Qaraeat Fi-Qanun Almahkamh Al-Dostoriah al’ur-
duniya, http://www.alraicenter.com/User_Site/Site/View_Articlear.aspx?-
type=2&ID=454.
30. Constitution of the Netherlands, supra note 11, art. 4. 
31. Id. art. 17 (limiting the court interpretation authority of constitutional text to 
only on the request of the cabinet or decision from one the legislative houses. ).
32. Constitutional Court Law 15/2012, art. 2. 
33. Ali Essa Yaqibie, Al-raqabah a’a Dustorihat al-Qawanun fi Franca, http://www.
tqmag.net/body.asp?field=news_arabic&id=2161&page_namper=p3. 
34. Samuel Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. Chi. Rev. 1275, 1281 (2010). 
35. Charles Manga Fombad, The New Cameroonian Constitutional Council in a 
Comparative Perspective: Progress or Retrogression,  42 J. Afr. L. 172, 180-181, 
(1998). 
36. Constitution of the French Republic, 4 October 1958, amended in 23 
July 2008, art. 61.
37. Federico Fabbrini, Kelsen in Paris: France’s Constitutional Reform and the 
Introduction of A Posteriori Constitutional Review of Legislation, http://cad-
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hand, it sustains the status of successive control of constitutionality, 
which gives a constitutional guarantee in case of any unconstitutional 
application of a certain law.38 The Tunisian Constitutional Court is 
responsible for reviewing the laws before they are submitted to the 
President, or in the event of a constitutional amendment.39  
Secondly, the JCC has to take responsibility for the conflict of 
jurisdiction among different legal institutions. The Jordanian legal 
system is pluralistic,40 where both religious and civil systems function 
simultaneously.41 The conflict of jurisdictions between different courts 
shall be assigned to the constitutional court.42 In Egypt, the Supreme 
Constitutional Court is the competent court in jurisdiction disputes, 
such as the dispute between the State Council and the ordinary 
courts.43 In Spain, the Constitutional Court has authority on conflict of 
jurisdiction between “the State and the Self-governing Communities, 
or between the Self-governing Communities themselves.” 44
mus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/20483/Fabbrini_GLJ_Kelsen%20in%20
Paris.pdf.
38. Maja Nastic, The Preventative Control of Constitutionality: Comparative Prac-
tices and Possible Application Pursuant to the Serbian Constitution, 56 Col-
lection Papers Fac. L. Nis 153, 172-173 (2010), See also, Stuart Woolman, 
Between Norms and Facts: The Constitutional Courts Commitment to Pluralism 
in South Africa’s Radically Heterogeneous Public School, 18 Potchefstroom 
Elec. L. J. 2079, 2080 (2015), Christa Rautenbach, Deep Legal Pluralism in 
South Africa: Judicial Accommodation of Non-State Law, http://commis-
sion-on-legal-pluralism.com/volumes/60/rautenbach-art.pdf.
39. Constitution of the Tunisia Republic, supra note 9, art. 120/2. 
40. The Reform of Judiciaries in the Wake of the Arab Spring, http://www.ref-
world.org/pdfid/515009ac2.pdf.
41. Id.
42. James Casey, the Spanish Constitutional Court, 25-27 Irish Juris (N.S) 26, 28, 
(1990-92). 
43. Constitution of Kingdom of Morocco, supra note 20, art. 192. 
44. Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain, 6 December 1978, art. 161. 
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III. PROCEDURAL AMENDMENT: 
ACCESSIBLE COURT 
Two major procedural amendments are required to establish an accessi-
ble JCC. Firstly, the Court of Cassation’s (CoC) constitutional role shall 
be abolished from the JCC law. In 2012, the constitutional competence 
was split between the CoC and the newly established JCC.45 However, 
the JCC law, instead of making a full constitutional jurisdiction,46 has 
given the CoC the ultimate authority to refer cases.47 This situation not 
only contradicts the basic goal for establishing the JCC but also does 
not stand its ground in comparative law. In Egypt, the constitutional 
competency was a prerogative of the CoC until 1979.48 Nonetheless, 
once the Supreme Constitutional Court was established, the CoC was 
disconnected from constitutional affairs. Currently, citizens can resort 
to the SCC directly after a referral from the first court.49 Hence, the 
new JCC law is not only considered an extra burden on constitutional 
litigation but also contradicts the aim of establishing an independent 
constitutional court. 
Moreover, the authority of case referral has to be decentralized. 
Any judge must have the right to transfer a constitutional claim 
directly to the JCC. In Germany, all courts have the right to review 
the constitutionality of certain laws.50 The Federal Constitutional Court 
has the ultimate right to strike down any unconstitutional law that 
was referred to it by the lower courts.51 The same applies to Egypt.52 
Therefore, decentralized referral authority would help in abolishing the 
45. Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, supra note 1. 
46. supra note 26, art. 11
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Gaber Gad Nassar and Nabilah Abdel Halim Kamel, Al-Wajiz fi-al-
qanun al-Dusturie, 167 (Dar al_nahdah Al’arabayah 2006).
50. Federal Constitutional Court, German Court, https://www.britannica.com/
topic/Federal-Constitutional-Court. 
51. The Reform, supra note 40. 
52. Supreme Constitutional Court Law no 48/1979, art. 29/B.
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procedural role of the CoC. 
Secondly, a commissioner’s office or legal clerkship positions must 
be introduced to ease the burdens of JCC procedures. Abolishing the 
role of the CoC will not only ease the adjudication process but will also 
open doors for a wave of cases transferred from lower courts directly to 
the JCC. The role of the commissioner or the law clerk is to prepare cases, 
and write unbinding constitutional opinions to the JCC.53 This system 
of the commissioner’s office is adopted in various countries, including 
Egypt.54 Some countries replace the commissioner system with that of 
a clerkship, as seen in cases of the US,55 and Germany. 56 Within this 
system, the law clerk, who is sometimes a law student or a lawyer, 
can help the judge in preparing cases, and writing up the judgment.57 
Introducing these two positions would therefore significantly decrease 
litigation time.
CONCLUSION
The establishment of the JCC is undoubtedly a major step in the legal 
reform process in Jordan. Despite this, this paper advocates three ma-
jor reforms of the JCC. Firstly, the paper introduces the adoption of a 
republican philosophy of the constitutional court in monarchies. The 
status of the JCC mandates a republican approach to issues like checks 
and balances. Secondly, the JCC needs to have effective competencies, 
in order to be able to meet the expectation of the Jordanian people. 
This will be achieved through increasing its competencies. Finally, the 
53. See, William Nelson, Harvery Rishikof, Scott Messinger & Michael Jo, The Lib-
eral Tradition of the Supreme Court Clerkship: Its Rise, Fall, and Reincarnation, 
62 Vand. L. Rev. 1747, 1748 (2009).
54. Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, supra note 16, art.193/2.
55. Laura Krugman Ray, The Legacy of a Supreme Court Clerkship: Stephen Breyer 
and Arthur Goldberg, 115 Penn. St. L. Rev.. 83, 83 -85(2010-2011).
56. Luiz Muniz Arguelles, and Migdalia Fraticelli Torres, Selection and Training of 
Judges in Spain, France, West Germany and England, 8 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 1, 37 (1995).
57. Id.
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previous reforms will not be feasible unless the JCC can adopt better 
procedures that ensure its accessibility for the public.
